February 24th 2025 marked the third year anniversary of Russia’s full scale invasion of Ukraine. Beginning as somewhat of a surprise to mainstream media, political analysts, and politicians around the globe (including those in Ukraine), Russia’s three-day “special military operation” has long proved to have been morphed into a grinding war of attrition moving on to its fourth year, with only meager signs of peace in the near future (Rachman, 2022, p 26). The painfully lethargic movement of the Russian army has culminated in the modest gains it has been able to make in Ukraine (Mappes, 2025). Plagued by a cavalcade of unforced errors, logistical issues, as well as personnel and equipment shortages, the Russian ruling class’ hopes for a swift victory have been dashed again and again (Wasielewski, 2023).

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Ukraine’s incursion into Kursk Oblast, with the capture of dozens of villages and towns including Sudzha, had thrown Russian elites into disarray by crossing yet another one of Putin’s ‘red lines’. The Ukrainian occupation lasted for over half a year as the Russian army, with the aid of North Korean troops, desperately attempted to force the Ukrainians out, only succeeding very recently as a result of Ukraine’s orderly withdrawal (Evans, 2025). However, the battlefield remains generally stable, with Ukraine’s army facing personnel and military shortages in almost every field (RC, 2024). Outmanned and outgunned, Ukraine’s army maintains the ability to hold Russia back. As such, the closure of this war through brute force alone will see this conflict continue for years to come. The recent electoral victory of Donald J. Trump has ushered in a new era of US-Russia relations, with the new president actively searching for a diplomatic end to the war in Ukraine. This article will investigate the ‘Trump peace plan’, and appraise its chances of ending Russia’s war on Ukraine.

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Enter Donald J. Trump

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Coming off of a landslide electoral college victory, Trump has been actively pursuing some of the campaign promises he made. Economic warfare, disguised under the name of tariffs, on the closest allies of the United States, Mexico and Canada, has been one of the top priorities of the re-elected president (The White House, 2025). Gestures at the seizure of the Panama Canal and Greenland have been frequent (Weissert & Miller, 2025), and the scolding of European allies has risen exponentially (Smialek & Erlanger, 2025). Other promises, such as targeting grocery expenses, including the outrageous cost of eggs, have been met with extreme negligence, as food prices soared and the stock market tanked (Green, 2025).

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On another count, Trump repeatedly expressed his desire to end the war in Ukraine. This is a goal he has been actively attempting to pursue. The first step taken in this direction was the re-opening of talks with Russia, beginning with direct phone calls between Trump and Putin (Quinn, 2025). Being held behind closed doors, there is very little that can be said about these private conversations. It can be deduced from Trump’s statements to the media, however, that his attitude towards Russia has drastically changed from that of the previous administration. The refusal to call Putin a dictator, whilst outright stating that Zelensky is, and even stopping short of rejecting the well-known fact that Russia initiated this war, is telling of the Kremlin’s potential influence on Trump (Ivanyshyn, 2025).

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The opening of communication with Russia led to the joint US-Russia Summit in Saudi Arabia. To the outrage of the Ukrainian and European communities, neither were invited to the table (Melkozerova, 2025). The US delegation was led by Secretary of State Marco Rubio joined by National Security Advisor Michael Waltz, and Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff (Kirby, 2025). Curiously, the Special Envoy for Ukraine Keith Kellogg was nowhere to be seen. Whilst Kellogg and his team claim that there is no power struggle, remarking that they are working closely with Witkoff, Simmons et. al (2025) cite insider sources claiming that the Kremlin refused to accept him at the table due to his partiality towards Ukraine. The Russian delegation boasted Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov together with the Presidential Advisor Yuri Ushakov (Kirby, 2025).

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Key elements of a future peace deal were discussed, including territorial concessions, security guarantees, as well as the never-ending Russian concern over NATO and its expansion. The outcome was lacklustre. The Russian delegation reiterated a number of proposals, which from the current standing of the front lines are at the least unreasonable. The Kremlin outright rejected the possibility of peacekeeping troops in Ukraine, thus making their stance obvious on any security guarantee provisions (CGTN, 2025). Moreover, it had sharpened its position on the Ukrainian territories which were included in the Russian Constitution, which state that the entirety of Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson Oblasts count as Russian (Synhaievska, 2023). Controlling about half of Kherson and Zaporizhzhia Oblasts after performing a “goodwill gesture” by retreating from Kherson city in November 2022, and solely focusing on control over the Donetsk Oblast which partially remains under firm Ukrainian control, it is inconsistent with the material conditions on the fields to demand such immense sacrifices in territory (Goncharova, 2025). As such, the summit thus far appears to be inconclusive.

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Neither Democracy Nor Diplomacy

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At the tail end of February, the Oval Office held the Trump-Zelensky Press Conference where the two leaders met for the first time since the former’s re-election. The public meeting cannot be described in any other way than chaotic. In between references towards Zelensky’s choice of clothing and suit jokes, the conference began with a lighthearted mood yet escalated into a demeaning shouting match (Agrawal, 2025). The main point of contention in this meeting was not JD Vance’s question of Zelensky’s ‘thankfulness’, nor was it necessarily Trump’s friendly attitudes towards Putin. Everything on the table was about security guarantees and future aid. Both presidents reached an insoluble contradiction on the necessary conditions for ceasefire. Zelensky explains that a ceasefire without guarantees is nothing but another Minsk agreement, which has been broken more times than one can count, given the starting point of hostilities began in the spring of 2014 (Rathi, 2025). For the majority of the two hour conference, Zelesnky had been rationalizing the importance of security guarantees, in whichever form, yet closed off by stating that “of course I want to stop the war... but with guarantees” (Rathi, 2025).

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Trump and Vance responded negatively by berating the Ukrainian President for his hard-headedness and reprimanding him for his supposed lack of decorum and ungratefulness. Trump felt offended when Zelensky argued that if the war continues the US might “feel it”, after which he went on a lengthy tirade claiming that Zelensky doesn’t “have the cards” (Rathi, 2025). In this respect, Trump is correct. Ukraine is a heavily dependent country that relies on the US as its lifeline for military and financial aid (Tsivkach, 2025). Despite holding on in the face of Russian aggression, Ukraine is unable to do it without US backing. Therefore, the procurement of this aid is life or death for Ukraine in the most literal sense of the words. Knowing this, Trump requested a mineral deal to be signed, which would allow US companies to gain access to 50% of the future profits of Ukrainian rare earth (Banco et al, 2025). Zelensky reluctantly agreed to sign it, despite being aware that this is prohibited under the Ukrainian Constitution which declares the proceeds belong to the people (CNBC, 2025). This deal, would of course, hinge on future US aid. After the conference, instead of signing the deal, Zelensky was asked to leave the White House, leaving the deal under question.

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The consequences of the disastrous fallout of Ukraine-US relations were felt in the coming days, when the US moved to halt all aid deliveries and intelligence sharing with Ukraine. Following a brief revival in relations and the determination of Zelensky to sign the mineral’s deal, the moratorium on aid and intelligence sharing was lifted (Robertson, 2025). Trump is determined to secure a business arrangement that heavily benefits the US at the expense of Ukraine. Regardless of having rejected the sentiment, Zelensky likewise understands that he has no cards left to play, thereby floating the potential minerals agreement as a lever for securing future aid, at no matter the cost.

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Ongoing Attempts

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Recent attempts prove the severe difficulty of imposing peace on actors that have diametrically opposed interests and conceptions of the future. In mid-March the US and Ukraine agreed on a 30-day ceasefire pending Russia’s decision. This proposal fell through due to Russia’s unwillingness to accept (Psaropoulos, 2025). Putin demanded that aid and intelligence sharing be removed again as a precondition to accepting a ceasefire (Zadorozhnyy, 2025). Whilst this shows that Russia is not ready for peace, thus securing some minimal diplomatic victory, it also conveys that Russia has not achieved its goals in demilitarizing Ukraine. Following this logic, a complete ceasefire in combination with further aid deliveries to Ukraine runs counter to Russia’s interests from the outset of the war.

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There was, however, an agreement on a partial ceasefire on energy targets. A step in the right direction, it remains unclear whether there will be further gains in the positive, or whether this deal itself falls through. There remains no tangible hope for an end to the war, nor any real ‘Trump peace plan’. If the interests of both warring states persist as they are, and due to no change of power it is highly unlikely for them to do so, the contradictions will be too sharp for any peaceful resolution to prosper. Trump may decide to apply even more pressure on Ukraine forcing it to bend the knee and accept a US-Russia dominated agreement. Nevertheless, any peace agreement, as stated by the Chinese Special Envoy to the EU Lu Shaye, should not be dictated by the US and Russia (Zadorozhnyy, 2025). The involvement of Ukraine and the EU are crucial to any acceptable and lasting Ukrainian peace deal.

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References

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Green, L. (2025). Stocks tank and egg prices soar under Trump. The Guardian. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2025/mar/12/stocks-us-economy-trump.

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