On March 6, Sudan instituted proceedings against the United Arab Emirates (UAE) before the International Court of Justice (ICJ), alleging that the UAE “is complicit in the genocide on the Masalit through its direction of and provision of extensive financial, political, and military support for the rebel RSF militia” (ICJ Press Release No. 2025/11). Pending a final judgment in the case, Sudan has requested the Court to issue provisional measures, requiring the UAE to “take all measures” to prevent any genocidal acts against the Masalit.

 

While decisions on cases brought before the ICJ often take several years, and it is likely that it will take the Court several weeks or months to make a decision on Sudan’s request to issue provisional measures, Sudan’s decision to institute proceedings before the ICJ could still impact arms sales to the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and bring more attention to the ongoing situation in Darfur.

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In January 2025, the United States formally declared that the RSF had committed genocide in Darfur during the current conflict in Sudan (Human Rights Watch, 2025). The United Nations (UN) Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide, Alice Wairimu Nderitu, has also expressed that there are circumstances in Darfur “in which a genocide could be occurring or has occurred” (BBC, 2024).

 

Genocide is prohibited by Article I of the Genocide Convention, and complicity in genocide is prohibited by Article III(e) of the Genocide Convention. Under Article IX of the treaty, the ICJ has jurisdiction to rule on disputes “relating to the interpretation, application or fulfilment” of the Genocide Convention. 

 

In Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro the ICJ clarified that complicity in genocide “includes the provision of means to enable or facilitate the commission of the crime” (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro, 2007, Paragraph 419). Several individuals and organizations have previously accused the UAE of exacerbating the conflict in Sudan through its support of the RSF. In January 2024, The UN Panel of Experts on the Sudan found allegations of UAE support to the RSF to be “credible” (S/AC.47/2024/PE/OC.1, Paragraphs 42, 49).

 

A July 2024 report by Amnesty International identified that recently-manufactured armoured personnel carriers from the UAE have been used by the RSF in Darfur (Amnesty International, 2024). In December 2024, Edem Wosornu, the UN Director of Operations and Advocacy in the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, told the United Nations Security Council that the UAE has been backing the RSF in its quest to “finish the genocide that began over 20 years ago” (SC/15947, 2024).

 

The UAE is not the only State that has been accused of providing military support to the RSF. According to a July 2024 report from Amnesty International, weapons and military equipment from Russia, China, Turkiye, and the UAE are being imported in large quantities into Sudan, then diverted to Darfur (Amnesty International, 2024). A September 2024 report from Human Rights Watch echoed these findings, but also identified that military equipment produced by companies in Iran and Serbia was being used in Sudan (Human Rights Watch, 2024).

 

Despite these reports, as discussed above, there is unlikely to be a decision on the merits of Sudan’s case at the ICJ in the near future, and there is no guarantee that provisional measures will be implemented. Furthermore, it may also be difficult for Sudan to achieve a “win” in this case – a ruling from the ICJ that the UAE is indeed complicit in genocide, that the UAE needs to stop providing support to the RSF, and that the UAE needs to compensate Sudan for the damages it has caused – because the UAE has a reservation to the dispute resolution clause under Article IX of the Genocide Convention. However, it can be argued that Sudan’s decision to institute proceedings against the UAE is already having an impact on the international stage, and that it could continue to impact the flow of weapons into Sudan.

 

According to three congressional aides in the United States, after quietly blocking arms sales to the UAE since late last year, the top Democrat on the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Rep. Gregory Meeks plans to make that hold public as he introduces a bill to take action against those fuelling the war in Sudan (Gramer and Gould, 2025). While Rep. Meeks has not publicly commented on whether the case before the ICJ influenced his decision, Meeks’ decision came one day after Sudan instituted its case against the UAE.

 

As Duffy notes in her book Strategic Human Rights Litigation: “What happens out of court, or in the proverbial ‘court of public opinion’ may be more important than what happens in the courtroom…A case may be successful…if…it forced open political space and debate, and exposed injustice” (Duffy, 2018). The conflict in Sudan has been largely overlooked, particularly with conflicts simultaneously occurring in several other States, and Sudan instituting this case before the ICJ has brought a great deal of attention to what is happening within its borders. There has been extensive international coverage and reactions to the case. 

 

Given the attention on Darfur and Sudan’s case before the ICJ, other States who are party to the Genocide Convention that are selling arms to Sudan or to States that sell arms to Sudan may decide to temporarily or permanently change course to avoid international scrutiny or even the risk of being brought before the ICJ as well. “The desire to avoid litigation can itself be a powerful force for change, sometimes inducing or feeding significant change even before (or indeed absent) a case itself” (Duffy, 2018).

 

Thus, regardless of whether Sudan “wins” its case before the ICJ, there is a possibility that its decision to institute proceedings against the UAE will extend beyond the courtroom, stem the flow of arms into its borders, and reduce the violence its citizens are being subjected to. 

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References

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BBC. (2024, May 24). World ignoring risk of Sudan genocide - UN expert. BBC News.
https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c511vgzvl2eo

Duffy, H. (2018). Strategic Human Rights Litigation: Understanding and Maximising Impact. Bloomsbury Publishing.

Human Rights Watch. (2024, September 9). Fanning the Flames.
https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/09/09/fanning-flames#_ftn26

Gramer, R., & Gould, J. (2025, March 7). Top lawmaker blocking US arms sales to UAE over role in Sudan War. POLITICO. https://www.politico.com/news/2025/03/07/arms-sales-uae-00217874

International Court of Justice. Press Release 2025/11.
https://www.icj-cij.org/sites/default/files/case-related/197/197-20250306-pre-01-00-en.pdf

Amnesty International. (2024, July 25). New weapons fuelling the Sudan conflict.
https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/research/2024/07/new-weapons-fuelling-the-sudan-conflict/

UN Press. (2024, December 19). Senior UN Official Tells Security Council That ‘Unbearable’ Numbers of Civilians Killed, Injured in Sudan, Urging End to Violence, Funding for Aid. SC/15947.

UN General Assembly. (1948, December 9). Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, United Nations Treaty Series, vol. 78, p. 277.

UN Panel of Experts on the Sudan. (2024, January 14). “Final report of the Panel of Experts on the Sudan,” S/AC.47/2024/PE/OC.1.

Human Rights Watch. (2025, January 8). US: State Department determines genocide in Sudan.
https://www.hrw.org/breaking-news/2025/01/08/us-state-department-determines-genocide-sudan

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