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September 24th 2025

The "Anti-Corruption" Corruption Scandal

PFP - Wilson Jones_edited.jpg

By Uilson Jones

Master's in Political Science: Nationalism, Ethnic Conflict and Development from Leiden University. Primary research focus pertains to Eastern European Affairs, specifically targeting East Slavic States. Find Uilson Jones on LinkedIn or email at wilson.pedna@gmail.com.

Image by Glib Albovsky

Ukraine’s battle against corruption can be described as a long and arduous journey, filled with twists and turns. On July 22, 2025, the commitment of the Ukrainian people towards anti-corruption efforts was tested yet again. The Verkhovna Rada, Ukraine’s parliamentary building situated on Hrushevsky Street (named after the early 20th century prominent Ukrainian statesman), adopted a new law targeting the independence of both of its Anti-Corruption bodies (HRW, 2025). The law was interpreted as a government overreach, and was universally denounced by Ukrainians at home and abroad (HRW, 2025). This article aims to outline the potential reasons for the adoption of this new law, its contents, as well as the implications it has for the future.

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Beginning with the fine print of the law, it is crucial to understand the nature of Ukraine’s struggle against corruption of the highest degree. Following the 2014 Revolution of Dignity, Ukraine established new Anti-Corruption bodies with the power to independently investigate, prosecute, and oversee high-level corruption cases (Ukraine, n.d.). These are the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU) and Special Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's Office (SAPO) respectively. Thus, ever since Ukraine’s pivot towards EU integration, the focus has been on a desperate struggle against the pervasive corruption culture, particularly at the highest echelons of society (Ukraine, n.d.). As such, on June 20, 2022, the Verkhovna Rada adopted the Anti-Corruption Strategy for 2021-2025, a 55 page document outlining the goals of greater governmental transparency, thereby inching towards the rigorous EU standard (NACP, 2025).


The law approved by the Verkhovna Rada in July, targeted the function of NABU and SAPO, effectively stripping them of their independence. Previously being entirely independent of governmental imposition, these bodies have been placed under the boot of the Prosecutor-General, and by implication the Presidential Office (HRW, 2025). This results in a great degree of power being transferred to the Ukrainian Executive branch, as corruption cases could potentially be shut down with a simple phone call from the Presidential Office. The Prosecutor-General is politically dependent on the President, as such creating an environment where suspicious activity may fester. Additionally, having the power to reassign cases from NABU to other bodies leaves the agency utterly powerless to implement its fundamental tasks - resigning it to a merely symbolic existence (HRW, 2025).


Civil society responded immediately by freely voicing their disagreement with the new law. Despite a great deal of backlash, already prior to the signing of the bill into law, it was rapidly pushed through the Verkhovna Rada and ratified by Volodymyr Zelenskyy on the same day (HRW, 2025). Many thousands took to the streets in the first widespread anti-government protests in Ukraine since the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion of the country. Regardless of Martial Law, people took to the streets to make their voices heard. Kyiv, Odessa, Lviv, and Kharkiv amongst others, saw streets filled to the brim with young people who felt betrayed by the law, and saw this as a deliberate erosion of the gains of the Revolution of Dignity (Volt Europa, 2025). The police responded with caution, allowing the demonstrations to take place, as tensions between the government and its citizens were hastily raising. A week later, at the end of July, the Verkhovna Rada approved the reversal of the law, thus restoring the independence of the NABU and SAPO (Fornusek et. al, 2025). Most certainly, a significant victory for the people - but the story does not end there.

 

There remain fundamental questions. Firstly, what are the sources of this seemingly hysterical governmental vacillation? Secondly, why change direction when the Anti-Corruption Scheme was so entrenched in the first place? Lastly, but most importantly, what is to come? Let us tackle these one at a time. The official reason for the law curtailing the independence of NABU and SAPO was stated as pervasive “Russian influence” (President of Ukraine, 2025). Likely used as a lazy pretext to remove the autonomy of the bodies, these claims lacked a crucial ingredient - evidence (Shandra, 2025). A more feasible explanation for this sudden vacillation in government policy towards anti-corruption measures was laid out by political analyst and head of the Penta think tank in Kyiv, Volodymyr Fesenko (Mirovalev, 2025). According to Fesenko, NABU became overly comfortable investigating Zelenskyy’s inner circle, particularly in their accusation of his Deputy Prime Minister receiving an illicit payment of $346,000 from a real estate agent, at the expense of a whopping $24,000,000 for the government (Mirovalev, 2025). Another potential explanation would fit into the political trend which Ukraine has experienced during Zelenskyy’s tenure in office. A slow but steady centralisation of power has characterised the recent years of Ukrainian politics leading to a great degree of power rested in the Executive Branch of government (Mirovalev, 2025). The fact that NABU and SAPO were still largely independent of the President’s Office, may have been a source of insecurity given the centralisation of the majority of political power. 

 

Fundamentally, these explanations remain as theories. A large amount of information, sources, and deals are hidden far from sight, thus making it overwhelmingly difficult to produce a legitimate response. Regardless, the initial move to pass the law, was supported universally in the Verkhovna Rada, even by parties which are in opposition to Zelenskyy’s Servant of the People party who initiated the law. Tymoshenko’s Batkivshchyna and Boyko’s pro-Russian parliamentary group - Platform for Life and Peace, both overwhelmingly supported the bill (Bartaway, 2025). The unity in agreement amongst these vastly diverse political platforms betrays the ubiquitous persistence of corruption in Ukrainian political life. Beyond this, there are positive trends that rest with the activity of Ukrainian civil society. Regardless of any restrictions on such widespread protests, Ukrainians across the country took matters into their own hands and singlehandedly forced the reversal of the law, thereby saving the gains made in the Revolution of Dignity. Both governments and people must not forget the fact of life - governments are allowed to exist insofar as the people allow it. The victory of the people is evident, yet the war on corruption must live on, aided by the overwhelming strength of Ukrainian civil society.
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References

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Bartaway, A. (2025). Protests begin over law limiting the independence of anti-corruption agencies. The New Voice of Ukraine. Available at: https://english.nv.ua/podcasts-video/first-night-of-protest-against-anti-corruption-bill-50531794.html.


Fornusek, M., Denisova, A. & Hodunova, K. (2025). Following street protests, Zelensky signs law restoring independence of anti-graft bodies. Kyiv Independent. Available at: https://kyivindependent.com/parliament-votes-on-bill-restoring-nabu-sapo-independence/.


Human Rights Watch. (2025). Ukraine: New law undercuts independence of anti-corruption bodies. Available at:
https://www.hrw.org/news/2025/07/24/ukraine-new-law-undercuts-independence-of-anti-corruption-bodies.


Mirovalev, M. (2025). Why did Zelenskyy try to curb autonomy of Ukraine’s anti-graft agencies? Al Jazeera. Available at: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/7/29/why-zelenskyy-tried-to-curb-autonomy-of-ukraines-anticorruption-agencies.


National Agency for Corruption Prevention. (2022). Anti-Corruption Strategy for 2021-2025. Available at: https://nazk.gov.ua/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/Anti-corruption-Strategy-for-2021-2025.pdf.


President of Ukraine. (2025). The anti-corruption infrastructure will work, only without Russian influence – It needs to be cleared of that – Address by the President. Available at: https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/antikorupcijna-infrastruktura-pracyuvatime-tilki-bez-rosijsk-99117.


Shandra, A. (2025). “Russian spies” who justified Ukraine’s anti-corruption crackdown nowhere to be found. Euromaidan Press. Available at: https://euromaidanpress.com/2025/08/07/russian-spies-who-justified-ukraines-anti-corruption-crackdown-nowhere-to-be-found/.


Ukraine. (n.d.). Institutions. Available at: https://ukraine.ua/transparent-ukraine/institutions/. Volt Europa. (2025). Ukraine’s anti-corruption battle. Available at: https://volteuropa.org/news/ukraines-anti-corruption-battle.

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PFP - Wilson Jones_edited.jpg

By Uilson Jones

Master's in Political Science: Nationalism, Ethnic Conflict and Development from Leiden University. Primary research focus pertains to Eastern European Affairs, specifically targeting East Slavic States. Find Uilson Jones on LinkedIn or email at wilson.pedna@gmail.com.

Disclaimer: The International Platform for Crime, Law, and AI is committed to fostering academic freedom and open discourse. The views and opinions expressed in published articles are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the platform, its editors, or its affiliates. We encourage diverse perspectives and critical discussions while upholding academic integrity and respect for all viewpoints.

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