Far-right extremist radicalisation is a multifaceted phenomenon that requires a nuanced approach to understand its causes and mechanisms. In recent years, the integration of criminological theories has proven essential for explaining how individuals become involved in far-right ideologies. This article explores how several criminological theories—such as Sutherland’s differential association theory, Merton’s strain theory, Hirschi’s control theory, and subculture theory—can collectively provide insight into the radicalisation process. It also investigates the role of digital spaces, particularly the Internet and online gaming platforms, as significant risk factors in accelerating the radicalisation of young individuals, often with serious psychological vulnerabilities.

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To begin with, Sutherland’s differential association theory (Sutherland et al., 1992) offers a foundational explanation for how individuals learn criminal behaviors through social interactions. In the context of FRE, globalisation and the widespread use of the Internet serve as key accelerants for radicalisation. Young people, especially those in isolated or vulnerable positions, often find themselves exposed to extremist ideologies through digital content. Algorithms on social media platforms and content-sharing websites play a crucial role in creating filter bubbles, reinforcing exposure to extreme right-wing materials.

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​As these platforms recommend likeminded accounts and ideas, users become increasingly isolated from broader perspectives. The use of generative ai and advanced neural networks by non-state extremist actors has been particularly damaging, as it enables the creation of high-quality digital propaganda, thereby encouraging radicalisation and further polarisation (Siegel & Doty, 2023). This dynamic highlights the ways in which digital environments amplify the process of radicalisation, especially when combined with manipulative algorithms. 

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A second criminological framework that is particularly relevant in understanding FRE radicalisation is Merton’s strain theory (Agnew, 2017). Merton’s theory suggests that individuals who experience frustration or alienation due to their inability to achieve societal goals may resort to deviant or criminal behavior as a means of coping. This is particularly relevant in fre radicalisation, where individuals who feel isolated by society's norms and structures may turn to violence as a way of rejecting these values and pushing for a radical revision of the social order (Carey, 2016). As these individuals struggle to find acceptance in mainstream society, their frustration can drive them to embrace extremist ideologies as a form of rebellion or as a means of achieving a sense of control.

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A third important theory is Hirschi’s control theory, which emphasizes the role of social bonds in preventing delinquency and deviant behavior. According to Hirschi, when individuals lack strong social bonds, they are more likely to engage in criminal activities. In the context of FRE, individuals often feel marginalized or rejected by society, which weakens their social bonds and drives them to seek out alternative groups where their beliefs are validated.

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This aligns with the labeling theory and subculture theory, which suggest that individuals who are labeled as "outsiders" or "deviant" often form subcultures that foster and reinforce their deviant behaviors (Donkers & Ziegler, 2023). For many young people, FRE groups offer a sense of belonging, a space where their extremist ideas are shared and celebrated, and where they can reject mainstream values in favor of a more insular, radical worldview.

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Turning to the demographic profile of FRE individuals, research has shown that the radicalisation process often involves young males, typically aged 15 to 30, although there is evidence to suggest that the age of individuals involved in FRE activities has been decreasing, particularly since the COVID-19 pandemic (EUROPOL, 2022). The increased use of online communication to connect with others and engage in gaming platforms has created new opportunities for FRE propaganda to spread, reaching younger audiences who may otherwise have been exposed to non-extremist ideologies.

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This trend has been particularly problematic in gaming spaces, where FRE propaganda is sometimes combined with the “gamification” of extremist ideas. (Lakhani et al., 2021). These online environments, which may seem innocuous at first, become a breeding ground for far-right ideologies, with young individuals engaging with content that promotes fascist utopias, extreme violence, and genocidal fantasies.

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The common denominator among individuals involved in FRE is their demographic characteristics: young males who often display poor social skills, psychological issues, and an intense fascination with violence, the military, and weapons. Studies show that this demographic is highly susceptible to extremist ideologies, particularly when they find communities online where these beliefs are shared and amplified.

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The 2023 EUROPOL report also highlights that FRE groups are not limited by nationality or ethnicity, though most suspects in law enforcement investigations have been citizens of the countries where they were arrested. This complex demographic makes it challenging for law enforcement and researchers to predict or prevent radicalisation before it occurs.

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Furthermore, as Lakhani et al. (2021) describe, the blurred boundary between the "real" and the "virtual" worlds is evident in attacks like the Christchurch shooting, where perpetrators drew directly from gaming elements and language to execute real-world violence. This fusion of online and offline violence marks a significant shift in the way radicalised individuals view their actions and the role of their online communities.

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The impact of this crossover between virtual and real-life actions is challenging, as it makes it increasingly difficult to identify or intervene in the radicalisation process until it is too late. It also challenges traditional approaches to deradicalisation, which have primarily focused on traditional, face-to-face encounters, rather than online and gamified spaces.

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In conclusion, understanding the radicalisation process within far-right extremist groups requires a multi-theoretical approach. Sutherland’s differential association theory, Merton’s strain theory, Hirschi’s control theory, and the subculture theory offer valuable insights into how individuals become involved in extremism. The rise of online platforms, gaming communities, and digital propaganda has created new avenues for radicalisation, particularly for vulnerable young individuals with psychological or social vulnerabilities. By integrating criminological theories with an understanding of modern digital dynamics, policymakers, law enforcement, and researchers can better address the growing threat of far-right extremism in the digital age.

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Further research is needed to explore the interplay between these theories and emerging digital platforms, and to develop strategies that can effectively prevent radicalisation and intervene before violence occurs.

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References

 

Agnew, R. (2017). Revitalizing Merton: General strain theory. The origins of American criminology (pp. 137-158). Routledge.

 

Carey, B. (2016). Running head: Agnew’s general strain theory: Context, synopsis, and application.

 

Donkers, T., & Ziegler, J. (2023). De-sounding echo chambers: Simulation-based analysis of polarization dynamics in social networks. Online Social Networks and Media, 37–38, 100275. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.osnem.2023.100275

 

European Commission Directorate-General Migration and Home Affairs. (2021). Project-based collaboration (PBC) on violent right-wing extremism (VRWE): EU member states participating in the project-based collaboration on violent right-wing extremism.

 

Siegel, D., & Doty, M. B. (2023). Weapons of mass disruption: Artificial intelligence and the production of extremist propaganda. Global Network on Extremism and Technology. Available online: https://gnet-research.org/2023/02/17/weapons-of-mass-disruption-artificial-intelligence-and-the-production-of-extremist-propaganda/

 

Sutherland, E. H., Cressey, D. R., & Luckenbill, D. F. (1992). Principles of criminology. Altamira Press.